Regulation, Credit Risk Transfer, and Bank Lending

Thilo Pausch, Peter Welzel

Beitrag Nr. 316, Februar 2011
Abstract

We integrate Basel II (and III) regulations into the industrial organization approach to banking and analyze lending behavior and risk sensitivity of a risk-neutral bank. The bank is exposed to credit risk and may use credit default swaps (CDS) for hedging purposes. Regulation is found to induce the risk-neutral bank to behave in a more risk-sensitive way: Compared to a situation without regulation the optimal volume of loans decreases more as the riskiness of loans increases. CDS trading is found to interact with the former effect when regulation accepts CDS as an instrument to mitigate credit risk. Under the Substitution Approach in Basel II (and III) a risk-neutral bank will over-, fully or under-hedge its total exposure to credit risk conditional on the CDS price being downward biased, unbiased or upward biased. This interaction promotes the intention of the Basel II (and III) regulations to “strengthen the soundness and stability of banks”, since capital adequacy regulation without accounting for the risk-mitigating effect of CDS trading would stimulate a risk-neutral bank to take more extreme positions in the CDS market.

Keywords: banking, regulation, credit risk

JEL classification: G21, G28
1 Introduction

There is a wide-spread view that some firms in the financial services industry had taken excessive risks before the onset of the recent banking crisis. Financial innovations enabling credit risk to be sold by the originator of a loan to a third party are suspected of having contributed to this risk taking. A large variety of financial contracts and institutional setups ranging from selling loans to markets for syndicated loans, and credit derivatives such as collateralized loan obligations and credit default swaps, to specialty finance companies can nowadays be used to trade credit risk. Hedge fund manager George Soros referred to credit default swap contracts as “toxic” and called for banning their use (Cullen, 2009).

On the part of the banks, the possibility to transfer credit risk supports the “originate-to-distribute” (OTD) business model. It liberates capital, thereby allowing for a greater volume of loans: “CDSs were created by J.P. Morgan’s derivatives group in 1994 to permit a bank to reduce its capital reserve requirement, which is based on a bank’s loan portfolio” (Helm et al., 2009, 3). At the same time it created new ways for optimizing banks’ asset portfolios (Duffie, 2007). Banks have been using these opportunities and are therefore the dominant players on both sides of markets for credit risk. An increased importance of buying credit derivatives in order to hedge banks’ trading has been reported by the British Bankers Association (cf. Mengle, 2007, 12).

While this more efficient use of bank capital generates macroeconomic benefits through more loans and higher growth, it is by no means clear whether the stability of the banking system as a whole benefits or suffers from banks selling credit risk. On the one hand, diversification of risks and spreading risk over a larger number of market participants ought to increase stability, on the other a higher total volume of loans in the economy and the lower incentive to screen and monitor credit risk under an OTD business model could decrease it. A bank knowing that it will sell credit risk after signing a loan contract will tend to put less effort into screening ex ante and into monitoring ex post which could lead to an inefficiently high level of credit risk in the economy as a whole.

---

1 Email: thilo.pausch@bundesbank.de. The views expressed in this paper represent the authors’ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff.

2 Corresponding author. Email: peter.welzel@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de.
Parallel to the rapid development of credit risk transfer since the middle of the 1990s there has been an ongoing discussion about the role of capital adequacy regulation to influence bank behavior and make banks more robust against shocks, i.e. to “strengthen the soundness and stability of banks” in the usual Basel parlance. Since capital adequacy regulation affects the maximum volume of loans a bank can hand out under a given level of capital and credit risk transfer liberates capital from regulatory duties, credit risk transfer and capital adequacy regulation interact.

The purpose of our paper is to analyze a bank’s risk taking in its loan business, when it is aware of the interplay of lending, credit risk transfer and regulatory requirements. We focus on a risk-neutral bank and credit derivatives used for hedging purposes, and put considerable emphasis on modeling capital adequacy rules and their influence on bank behavior in a way that the Basel rules are correctly reflected. More specifically we ask the following questions: How does capital adequacy regulation affect a bank’s lending behavior? How does a bank react to increases in risk (without regulation or with regulation)? How does credit risk transfer with credit default swaps (CDS) affect bank lending conditional on pricing in the derivatives markets? Having seen credit risk transfer under heavy attack in the aftermath of the recent banking crisis, we also want to contribute to a realistic view on the pros and cons of this part of a bank’s risk management.

Our analysis confirms that capital adequacy regulation lowers loan volume and increases the interest rate on loans. In addition we find that a bank reduces loan volume and increases interest on loans as a reaction to an increase in credit risk in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance (FSD). A capital regulation sensitive to risk amplifies the bank’s reaction to a risk increase. If, however, capital regulation is insensitive to risk, the bank’s behavior following a risk increase is exactly the same as in the case without regulation.

Capital adequacy regulation also interacts with the bank’s position in the CDS market. Without regulation a bank will not use credit risk transfer under FSD as long as the CDS market is unbiased, i.e. the derivative price is equal to the expected loss rate. The bank will sell credit risk when the CDS contract is priced below the expected loss rate (and it will want to buy credit risk in case of an upward distortion). Under capital regulation of the Basel II (and III) type a bank will have a stronger incentive to use credit risk transfer under FSD, if the counterparty has a lower risk weight (better rating) than the lender. The amount of hedging chosen depends on the price of CDS contracts: if the market is downward biased, unbiased or upward biased, the bank will find it optimal to over-hedge, fully hedge or under-hedge its total credit risk exposure, respectively. It also adjusts lending decisions contingent on the price of CDS contracts and the corresponding hedging strategy: if the CDS market is downward biased, unbiased or upward biased, the bank will find it optimal to increase lending, leave the volume of loans unchanged or reduce lending compared to an unregulated bank, respectively.
The plan of the paper is as follows: In the next section we briefly review the literature (2.). Section 3 contains our basic model and an analysis of how a bank reacts to changes in risk both in a regime without and with capital adequacy regulation. We then introduce credit risk transfer and examine the influence of regulation on hedging and loan decisions (4.). Section 5 summarizes and discusses our results.

2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Duffie (2008) in an article which was effectively written in (pre-crisis) 2007 summarizes a large number of aspects concerning credit risk transfer and on the whole takes a positive view. Earlier on, Instefjord (2005) pointed already to the fact that bank risk can increase when credit risk is tradable. The effect that credit risk transfer induces banks to take on more risk can be dominant, in particular when competition in the banking industry is stronger.

Wagner and Marsh (2006) find that banks have an increasing incentive to transfer credit risk off their balance sheets as opportunities for credit risk transfer improve. As a consequence, they increase their risk-taking by expanding the volume of loans. This has, however, no effect on a bank’s exposure to credit risk, since the additional risk is also transferred to the CRT market. In other words: banks fully hedge their credit risk exposure when there exist adequate opportunities for credit risk transfer. Similar full-hedge results can be found in work by Broll and various co-authors, e.g. Broll et al. (2004). As soon as no perfect hedge instrument is available, e.g. because of the existence of basis risk, the full-hedge propositions break down and an increase in loan volume coincides with an increase in risk. A dynamic analysis of the use of credit derivatives as a risk management device is provided in Broll, Gilroy and Lukas (2007).

The paper by Wagner (2007) argues that an increased liquidity of bank assets may increase banking instability and the externalities associated with bank failures. The reason for this is that higher asset liquidity, on the one hand, encourages banks to reduce their exposure to risk. This also increases the stability of a certain bank. On the other hand, however, higher asset liquidity creates an incentive for banks to take on new risks, which may offset the previous risk-reducing effect.

In an early contribution Santomero and Trester (1998) analyze the effects of improved liquidity in bank loan markets (due to, e.g., securitization, credit derivatives etc.) on banks’ supply of loans and risk-taking behavior in a model of asymmetric information. They find that decreasing costs of transmitting bank-specific information to the market causes a tradeoff between enhanced asset liquidity and increasing risk in banks because of more risky loans. More recent findings considering asymmetric information include Duffee and Zhou (2001) who use a model with moral hazard and adverse selection to analyze whether credit derivatives may be used to trade heretofore non-tradable credit risk exposures. They find that this is possible for those parts of credit risk exposures with a small degree of asymmetric information. However, using this opportunity to trade credit risk exposures may
destroy other risk-sharing mechanisms and raise a bank’s exposure to credit risk (for arguments see Morrison, 2005).

Turning to capital adequacy regulation we point to VanHoose (2007) who reviews the theoretical literature on bank behavior under capital requirements. He finds that this literature produces highly mixed predictions with regard to the effects of capital regulation on banks’ risk-taking behavior.

Nicolo and Pelizzon (2008) investigate the optimal design of credit derivatives contracts in a setting of adverse selection where banks are subject to capital requirements. While this question is beyond the scope of our paper, their result that optimal credit derivatives contracts are largely dependent on bank regulation is also relevant for our analysis. In particular, Nicolo and Pelizzon point out that their findings suggest that asymmetric information may generate underpricing of credit derivatives products when capital requirements make the retention of risk costly for the bank which is especially true for credit default swaps (CDS). As we shall argue later, the results of Nicolo and Pelizzon (2008) support the assumption of downward-biased CDS markets used in the present paper.

As for the empirical side of credit risk management we first note that Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) investigate empirically how active management of credit risk using loan sales affects capital structure, lending, profits, and risk of banks. They find that banks which are active in the loan sales market hold less capital and make more risky loans than other banks. They conclude that advances in credit risk management enhance credit availability rather than reduce risk in the banking system. Goderis et al. (2007) analyze whether the access to credit derivatives products markets affects banks’ lending behavior. They find that banks which actively use credit derivatives increase their target loan volumes by around 50% compared to banks that do not participate in credit derivatives markets. Brewer III, Minton and Moser (2000) empirically analyze the relation between bank participation in (interest-rate) derivatives contracting and bank lending. They find that banks which make use of interest-rate derivatives hold larger volumes of loans than banks which do not use derivatives.

Berndt and Gupta (2008) and provide evidence that loan quality is lower for banks using the OTD business model because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Purnanandam (2010) show this effect to be stronger for capital-constrained banks.

As for the use of credit derivatives, Minton et al. (2006), Gibson (2007), and D’Arcy et al. (2009) present information which is mostly based on data from the British Bankers’ Association and the Bank for International Settlements. ECB (2009) addresses counterparty risk. Mengle (2007) provides data on counterparties and role of bank loans. Meng and Ap Gwilym (2007) analyze trading of credit default swaps based on single-name entities. They found that 81% of underlyings were corporate debt and 12% sovereign debt. Concerning the link between credit derivatives and capital requirements, see ECB (2009, 37-38) for information.
A comprehensive discussion of the role of credit derivatives, in particular credit default swaps, in the recent banking crisis is presented in Stulz (2010). He addresses the linkages created between financial intermediaries by taking positions in markets for credit derivatives, an issue which is beyond the scope of the present paper.

The basics of the modeling approach used in our paper, the industrial economics approach to banking, can be found in Freixas and Rochet (2008). Analyses of risk within this framework were performed e.g. by Zarruk and Madura (1992), Wong (1997), Wahl and Broll (2000), Broll et al. (2004), Lin and Jou (2005) and Broll and Wong (2010). We follow the lead of this literature also with respect to market structure, i.e. we consider a monopolistic bank. This enables us to include market power without having to deal with strategic interaction in a banking oligopoly.

3 MODEL

3.1 BASIC SETUP

To model bank behavior we apply the industrial organization approach to banking (cf. Freixas and Rochet, 2008, ch. 3), augmented by uncertainty of the credit risk type (cf. Wong, 2007). More specifically, we consider a one-period setting with a large banking firm taking deposits $D$ and giving loans $L$ which enjoys market power in both the deposit and loan market. $D$ and $L$ can be interpreted either as the total of homogeneous deposits and the total of homogenous loans or as aggregates representing a portfolio of deposits and loans, respectively. The decisions on loans and deposits are made via the setting of loan and deposit rates $r_L$ and $r_D$, respectively, at the beginning of the period. The bank faces a loan demand function $L(r_L)$ with $L'(r_L) < 0$ and $L''(r_L) < 0$ and a deposit supply function $D(r_D)$ with $D'(r_D) > 0$ and $D''(r_D) < 0$. In other words, both the demand for loans and the supply of deposits are assumed to be concave functions.\(^3\)

Operational costs of financial intermediation are described by a cost function $C(D, L)$ with partial derivatives $C_D(D, L) > 0$, $C_L(D, L) > 0$, $C_{DD}(D, L) > 0$, $C_{LL}(D, L) > 0$ and $C_{DL}(D, L) = C_{LD}(D, L) = 0$. I.e., we assume the cost function to be convex in loans and deposits and do not consider any economies or diseconomies of scope.

Let $K$ be the bank’s equity capital. The balance sheet constraint can be written as $L + M = D + K$, where $M$ is the amount of excess ($M > 0$ when $L < D + K$) or shortage ($M < 0$ when $L > D + K$) in liabilities which can be lent or borrowed at a risk free interest rate $r > 0$. If we interpret the bank under consideration as one of a large number of local monopolists, this lending or borrowing would occur in a competitive interbank market for

\(^3\) These concavity assumptions are made to simplify the exposition of our argument. They could be replaced by less restrictive conditions to ensure the concavity of the bank’s objective function without changing the qualitative nature of our results.
funds. Otherwise, $r$ could be interpreted as an interest rate controlled by the central bank through its monetary policy.

The bank faces credit risk as a unique source of risk, i.e., we abstract from the interaction of different types of risk and focus on credit risk as the most important one in the traditional business of financial intermediation. For modeling credit risk we follow the lead of Wong (1997): Let the random variable $\tilde{\theta} \in [0,1]$ denote the share of the bank’s loan portfolio which is non-performing at the end of the period in the sense that borrowers fully default on payment of interest and repayment of principal. Such non-performing loans have to be written off completely.\(^4\)

Our bank is required to hold a minimum level of equity depending on the amount of risk-weighted loans. More specifically,

$$K \geq K \left( \Lambda \left( L(r_L) \big| s \right) \right) \quad \text{with} \quad K'(\cdot) \geq 0, \Lambda'(L(r_L) \big| s) \geq 0 \quad (1)$$

The functions $K$ and $\Lambda$ capture the regulatory rules, and $s$ is a parameter characterizing the riskiness of the bank’s loan portfolio. $\Lambda(\cdot)$ represents the risk-weighted loan volume, $K(\cdot)$ the regulatory equity required on the basis of $\Lambda(\cdot)$. The risk-weighted loan volume $\Lambda$ is non-decreasing in the total volume of loans $L$, and a higher $\Lambda$ requires more regulatory capital $K$. A reasonable regulation should, in addition, consider $\Lambda(\cdot)$ being an increasing function of $s$ which is, for instance, the case for Basel-type regulation (see our Appendix). (1) is capable of capturing a wide variety of regulatory regimes well beyond the Basel framework. In the limiting case of $K'(\cdot)=0$ we would even have the situation of no capital adequacy regulation or a trivial one which is completely insensitive to risk-weighted loan volume. The regulatory approach for credit risk under both the Basel I and the Basel II capital accord is included in our specification, as we explain in more detail in the Appendix to this paper. Recent proposals for a new Basel III accord in the follow-up to the banking crisis are also perfectly in line with (1). Under Basel I and II, we have $\Lambda'(\cdot) > 0$. This holds notwithstanding the fact that a bank might create a more diversified, i.e., less risky, loan portfolio when expanding $L$, since none of the regulatory approaches for credit risk explicitly accounts for diversification.\(^5\) $\Lambda'(\cdot) = 0$ refers to the limiting case of a risk-weighting scheme such that an increase in loans does not lead to a higher risk-weighted loan volume. Under the Basel framework this could only occur in the Standard Approach and a risk increase limited to loans with a risk weight of zero. As we explain in the Appendix, current Basel-type regulation also means that we have $\Lambda''(\cdot) = 0, \partial \Lambda'/\partial s > 0$ and $K''(\cdot) = 0$.

\(^4\)Our approach could similarly be used to examine the case of borrowers only defaulting on interest payments or other forms of partial default.

\(^5\)In fact, the existing regulatory framework assumes a positive asset correlation (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005, 8-9). Under Basel III this assumed positive correlation can be expected to be even higher (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010, 36-37).
Before conducting our formal analysis, it is necessary to take a look at the cost of capital \( r_K \) which we interpret as a normal return on equity in the banking industry. The consensus in the literature is that the cost of capital has to be above the riskless rate of return in the market. Agency costs are probably the most important explanation for this statement. Such agency costs arise because of asymmetric information between the bank’s management and the owners of its equity capital (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Myers and Majluf, 1984, for details). In other words, due to agency costs \( r < r_K \). Therefore, given the volume of loans and the level of credit risk the bank is interested in employing the lowest level of equity possible. For that reason the regulatory constraint will be considered as binding in the sequel.

With this information the random profit of the bank can be written as

\[
\tilde{\Pi} = (1 - \tilde{\theta})r_L L(r_L) - \tilde{\theta}L(r_L) + rM - r_D D(r_D) - r_K K \left( \Lambda(L(r_L) \mid s) \right) - C(D, L)
\]

(2)

A tilde “\( \sim \)” denotes a stochastic variable. Substituting for \( M \) from the balance sheet constraint and collecting terms yields

\[
\tilde{\Pi} = (r_L - r)L(r_L) - \tilde{\theta}(1 + r_L)L(r_L) + (r - r_D) D(r_D) + (r - r_K) K \left( \Lambda(L(r_L) \mid s) \right) - C(D, L)
\]

(3)

Throughout the paper we consider a risk-neutral bank. We are aware of numerous reasons why actual bank behavior will probably be influenced by risk aversion or appear risk-averse. These reasons range from individual risk aversion of bank managers, convex taxation, and cost of financial distress to capital market imperfections (Froot et al., 1993, Froot and Stein, 1998; for an application to banking see Pausch and Welzel, 2002). In our view the assumption of risk aversion not only facilitates the analysis but also serves as a useful benchmark when looking at the interplay of risk management and capital regulation (Pausch and Welzel, 2002, show that due to capital requirements a de facto risk-neutral bank behaves as if it were risk-averse).

Maximizing expected profit with respect to loan volume and deposit volume leads to first-order necessary conditions

\[
- \frac{D(r_D)}{D'(r_D)} - r_D + r - C_D(D, L) = 0
\]

(4)

\[
(1 - \tilde{\theta}) \left( \frac{L(r_L)}{L'(r_L)} + r_L \right) - (r + \tilde{\theta}) - C_L(D, L) + (r - r_K) K'() \Lambda'(\cdot) = 0
\]

(5)

where \( \tilde{\theta} = E(\theta) \).

Under our assumption on the cross-derivative of the cost function the decisions for deposit and loan rates can be separated. Therefore, equation (4) defines the optimal deposit rate and equation (5) defines the optimal loan rate. We observe that through \((r - r_K) K'() \Lambda'(\cdot)\)
the bank’s loan business is affected by capital adequacy regulation which is not the case for its deposit business. \((r - r_k')K'() = \Lambda'()\) is negative due to our assumptions on regulation and on the cost of equity capital. Therefore the loan rate unambiguously increases as a result of the introduction of the regulation.

We can thus state our first proposition:

**Proposition 1:** Capital adequacy regulation leads to an increase of the optimal loan rate and a decrease in the volume of loans.

Proof: To prove the proposition we adopt a similar proof from Wahl, Broll (2000). Using 
\((r - r_k')K'()\Lambda'() < 0\), (5) implies 
\((1 - \overline{\theta})(L(r_L)/L'(r_L) + r_L) - (r + \overline{\theta}) - C_L(D, L(r_L)) > 0\) in the optimum. If there were no regulation, 
\((1 - \overline{\theta})(L(r^*_L)/L'(r^*_L) + r^*_L) - (r + \overline{\theta}) - C_L(D, L(r^*_L)) = 0\) would characterize the bank’s optimal behavior in the loan market with \(r^*_L\) denoting interest on loans in the absence of regulation. Comparing these two expressions, we get

\[
(1 - \overline{\theta})(r_L - r^*_L) > (1 - \overline{\theta}) \left( \frac{L(r^*_L)}{L'(r^*_L)} - \frac{L(L)}{L'(L)} \right) - \left( C_L(D, L(r^*_L)) - C_L(D, L(L)) \right)
\]

Assume that the loan rate does not rise as a result of regulation \((r_L \leq r^*_L)\). From our assumptions on loan demand \(L(r_L)\) and operational costs \(C(D, L)\) we then know 
\(L(r_L) \geq L(r^*_L)\), \(L'(r_L) \geq L'(r^*_L)\) and 
\(C_L(D, L(r_L)) \geq C_L(D, L(r^*_L))\). Keeping in mind \(1 - \overline{\theta} > 0\) and \(L'(r_L), L'(r^*_L) < 0\), the above equation implies 
\(r_L - r^*_L > 0\) which contradicts the assumption. □

The intuitive reason for this result is the following: Introducing capital adequacy regulation creates a link between both sides of the bank’s balance sheet. A higher level of \(r_L\) lowers the volume of loans and thereby reduces the capital requirement and with it the cost of equity capital. Note that Gehrig (1996) also found a negative impact of regulation on loan volume, but in his moral hazard framework it is the reduced incentive to monitor which drives this result. Blum and Hellwig (1995) provide yet another argument for a smaller loan volume under regulation. In their macroeconomic analysis capital adequacy regulation reinforces macroeconomic shocks by lowering equity of banks because of loan write-offs during a recession and thereby reducing loan volume. This procyclical effect of banking regulation received a lot of attention during the recent banking crisis. Our result emphasizes the direct impact of capital requirements on loan volumes which is perfectly in line with the regulatory objective of making bank failure less likely.

3.2 Changes in Risk

But as mentioned before the overall aim of capital adequacy regulation under the Basel Accord is to improve the safety of the banking system. The existence of regulation should
therefore reduce the bank’s exposure to risk. As a consequence even a risk-neutral bank should be sensitive to risk, if there is capital adequacy regulation.

To analyze changes in the risk of the bank’s loan portfolio we use the concept of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD). Let $F(\theta|s) = \Pr(\bar{\theta} \leq \theta|s)$ the cumulative distribution of credit risk conditional on the risk parameter $s$. We define an increase in risk as in Wong (1996) as

$$\frac{d}{ds} F(\theta|s) < 0 \quad \forall \theta$$

(6)

$F(\theta|s)$

1

1

$\theta$

FIGURE 1: FIRST-ORDER STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE OF CREDIT RISK

Figure 1 illustrates FSD of credit risk. If $s$ is higher, the cumulative distribution of $\theta$ is lower for all $\theta$, i.e., the cumulative probability that credit risk takes on low values is lower. An increase in $s$ increases the risk of the bank’s loan portfolio. Note that we use FSD and not a mean preserving spread (cf. Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) to model higher risk. This is due to our perception that increases in the risk of a loan portfolio will typically not leave the mean unaffected.

To investigate the impact of a change in risk on the loan rate we apply the implicit function theorem on the first-order condition $\partial E(\bar{\Pi})/\partial r_L = 0$ to get

$$\frac{dr_L}{ds} = -\left(\frac{\partial^2 E(\bar{\Pi})}{\partial r_L \partial s}\right)\left(\frac{\partial^2 E(\bar{\Pi})}{(\partial r_L)^2}\right)^{-1}$$

(7)

Differentiating (5) with respect to $r_L$.
\[
\frac{\partial^2 E(\Pi)}{\partial (r_L)^2} = (1-\overline{\theta})(r_L L'' + 2L') - (r + \overline{\theta})L'' - C_L L'' - C_{LL}(L')^2
\]
\[
+ (r - r_k) \left( K^*\cdot (\Lambda' L')^2 + K'\Lambda^*\cdot (L')^2 + K'\Lambda' L'' \right)
\]  
(8)

and using (5) yields for the denominator of (7)

\[
\frac{\partial^3 E(\Pi)}{(\partial r_L)^2} = 2(1-\overline{\theta})L'(r_L) + (r - r_k) \left[ K^*\cdot (\Lambda' L'(r_L))^2 + K'\cdot \Lambda^*\cdot (L'(r_L))^2 \right]
\]
\[
- C_{LL}(D, L)(L'(r_L))^2 - (1-\overline{\theta}) \frac{L(r_L)}{L'(r_L)} L''(r_L)
\]  
(9)

which is negative, if the squared bracket, measuring the second-order effect of the volume of loans on capital requirements, is positive or zero. While \( K^*\cdot (\cdot) \geq 0 \), which is a most natural quality of any capital regulation we can imagine, ensures a positive sign of the first term in this bracket, we have no general intuition about the sign of \( \Lambda^*\cdot (\cdot) \) which is decisive for the second. However, as we show in the appendix, under Basel-type regulation \( K^* \) and \( \Lambda^* \) are equal to zero which unambiguously leads to a negative sign of (9).

Differentiating (5) with respect to \( s \) yields

\[
\frac{\partial^3 E(\Pi)}{\partial r_L \partial s} = -\frac{d\overline{\theta}}{ds} L'(r_L) \left( \frac{L(r_L)}{L'(r_L)} + r_L + 1 \right) + (r - r_k) \frac{L(r_L)}{L'(r_L)} \left[ K^*\cdot \Lambda'(r_L) \frac{d\Lambda}{ds} + K'\cdot \frac{d\Lambda'}{ds} \right]
\]  
(10)

for the numerator of (7) which has a positive sign under any reasonable regulatory regime. The second part of (10) is positive due to the positive sign of the squared bracket: the derivative of \( \Lambda' \) with respect to \( s \) measures the reagibility of the risk-weighted loan volume to an increase in risk. It is positive under any reasonable regulatory regime and under the Basel regime in particular, as are \( d\Lambda/ds \) and \( d\Lambda'/ds \) (cf. the appendix).

For the sign of the first term in (10) consider first \( \frac{d\overline{\theta}}{ds} \), i.e. the impact of the level of risk \( s \) on the expected share of non-performing loans which can be written as

\[
\overline{\theta} = 1 - \int_0^1 F(\overline{\theta} | s) d\overline{\theta}.
\]

Differentiating this term with respect to \( s \) yields

\[
\frac{d\overline{\theta}}{ds} = -\int_0^1 \frac{d}{ds} F(\overline{\theta} | s) d\overline{\theta} > 0
\]

due to our earlier assumption \( \frac{d}{ds} F(\overline{\theta} | s) < 0 \). Moreover, from the first-order necessary condition for the optimal level of \( r_L \) one derives
\[(1 - \bar{\theta}) \left( \frac{L(r_c)}{L'(r_c)} + r_c \right) = (r + \bar{\theta}) + C_L(D, L) - (r - r_K)K'(\cdot)\Lambda'(\cdot) \]

with the right-hand side of this equation being positive due to \( r - r_K < 0 \) and our further assumptions. Due to \( 1 - \bar{\theta} > 0 \) this implies
\[
\frac{L(r_c)}{L'(r_c)} + r_c > 0
\]
in the optimum. Therefore, with \( L'(r_c) < 0 \) it follows for the first part of equation (10) that
\[
L'(r_c) \left( \frac{L(r_c)}{L'(r_c)} + r_c + 1 \right) < 0.
\]

We can now comment on the sign of (7): If there is no regulation in place, the squared brackets in (9) and (10) vanish and the impact of an increase in risk on the optimal loan rate is unambiguously positive. Higher risk leads to a higher interest on loans and to a lower volume of loans. As a result the (risk-neutral) bank invests less in risky loans when their risk has increased. This behaviour appears to be straightforward: modelling an increase in credit risk by a first-order stochastic dominance deterioration of the probability distribution of the share of non-performing loans implies a higher expected share of non-performing loans when \( s \) increases \((d\bar{\theta}/ds > 0)\). By reducing the total volume of loans, the bank also reduces its exposure to credit risk.

Consider next the impact of capital regulation on bank behavior. If \( K^* \geq 0 \) and \( \Lambda^* \geq 0 \) hold for a regulatory regime, a bank’s reaction to an increase in risk in the loan market is reinforced. Regulation further reduces risk-taking of a risk-neutral bank. It introduces a kind of as-if risk aversion. To see this, observe that (9) remains the same (which is the case for Basel-type regulation) or becomes smaller (greater in absolute value) as regulation is introduced. At the same time, (10) increases. Taken together this implies by (7) that regulation leads to a stronger reaction of the interest rate to an increase in risk, i.e., the bank reduces its loan business to a larger extent compared to the case with no regulation. Regulation imposes a cost on expanding loan business. The effect of the regulation reinforces the effect that governs the bank’s reaction to changing risk without regulation.

Our insights can be summarized in the following proposition:

**Proposition 2**: A risk-neutral bank reduces its loan volume as a consequence of a first-order dominance increase in risk. Capital regulation reinforces this reduction in risk-taking.

The interaction of risk and regulation restricts banks in their loan business and may create an incentive for credit risk transfer which we analyze in the next section.
4 CREDIT RISK TRANSFER

Under the regulatory framework of Basel II the use of credit default swaps (CDS) can affect the capital required for regulatory reasons. The so-called substitution approach implies that the volume of loans hedged by a CDS gets the risk weight of the counterparty.\(^6\)

Assume a market for credit default swaps where the bank can buy or sell any desired amount of CDS contracts. In particular, under such a contract the buyer of protection transfers credit risk \(\tilde{\theta}\) to the seller. In exchange the seller of protection gets paid a certain premium which is denoted by \(p\). We treat this premium as given, i.e. do not consider market power of the bank or its counterparty in the derivatives market.

When making use of CDS, the bank’s (random) profit can be rewritten as

\[
\hat{\Pi} = (r_L - r)L(r_L) - \tilde{\theta}(1 + r_L)L(r_L) + (r - r_d)D(r_d) + (r - r_K)K(\cdot) + H(\tilde{\theta} - p) - C(D(r_L), L(r_L))
\]

(11)

where \(H\) denotes the amount of CDS contracts bought. Taking the expected value of the bank’s random profit yields

\[
E(\hat{\Pi}) = (r_L - r)L(r_L) - \tilde{\theta}(1 + r_L)L(r_L) + (r - r_d)D(r_d) + (r - r_K)K(\cdot) + H(\tilde{\theta} - p) - C(D(r_L), L(r_L))
\]

(12)

When the capital adequacy regulation does not account for a bank’s activities in the CDS market, the optimal level of \(H\) is determined by the following first-order necessary condition:

\[
\tilde{\theta} - p = 0
\]

(13)

This condition supplements the first-order necessary conditions for the optimal deposit and loan rates which remain unchanged compared to the previous section.

Inspection of (13) reveals that when the CDS market is unbiased, i.e. \(p = \tilde{\theta}\), the bank is indifferent between any level of \(H\) and not participating in CDS trading at all. The reason for this is that participating in the CDS market does not affect the bank’s expected profit it cares for under risk neutrality, when the market is unbiased. In this case \(p = \tilde{\theta}\) implies \(H(\tilde{\theta} - \tilde{\theta}) = 0\). As a further implication of an unbiased CDS market note that variations in the level of credit risk, e.g. in the form of FSD analyzed above, are immediately reflected in the pricing of CDS contracts. As a result, a risk-neutral bank has no incentive to engage in CDS trading as long as there are no other mechanisms, for instance regulation, which make hedging a valuable activity.

---

\(^6\) Since this created an incentive to transfer risk to unregulated non-banks and may thus have contributed to the recent banking crisis, it is a debate whether the new Basel III framework should introduce modifications to this substitution (cf. Deutsche Bundesbank, 2010, 50).
When the exogenous price $p$ of CDS contracts is lower than $\bar{\theta}$, i.e., the CDS market is biased in the downward direction, the first-order condition implies that it is optimal for the bank to buy the maximum available amount of CDS contracts. In this case CDS trading increases the bank’s expected profit. The opposite holds when the price of the CDS contract is higher than $\bar{\theta}$. Optimality requires a negative value of $H$, i.e. the bank would prefer to become a seller of protection against credit risk since any positive amount of CDS contracts bought would reduce the bank’s expected profit.

To analyze the effects of a capital adequacy regulation taking into account hedging activities on the bank’s optimal interest rates and CDS trading we modify the function $\Lambda(\cdot)$. The current Basel framework and the new Basel III framework both allow for a substitution approach regarding CDS trading. For CDS contracts that are used to mitigate a bank’s exposure to credit risk, the bank is allowed to apply the counterparty’s risk weight to the amount of loans that underlie the credit risk exposure that was hedged by the CDS contracts. Provided the counterparty’s risk weight is below the original risk weight of the hedged loans, the bank can reduce the amount of risk weighted assets and, in turn, the amount of regulatory required capital by hedging credit risk with CDS contracts.

In the following we focus on this latter case and modify the representation of the regulatory required capital in our model.\footnote{Otherwise the bank would be in the rather implausible situation where capital adequacy regulation requires the bank to hold more capital for the hedged exposure to credit risk.} In particular, we include the hedging volume $H$ in the function $\Lambda(\cdot)$ that determines the amount of risk-weighted assets to account for credit risk mitigation by CDS trading. The modified function

$$\Lambda(L(r_L), H \mid s)$$

is strictly positive for any level and combination of $L(r_L), H$ and $s$. With respect to the shape of this function the Basel requirements imply

$$\frac{\partial \Lambda(\cdot)}{\partial H} = 0 \Leftrightarrow (1 + r_L)L = H \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \Lambda(\cdot)}{\partial L(r_L)} = 0 \Leftrightarrow (1 + r_L)L = H$$

Given that the counterparty’s risk weight is less than the risk weight of a loan which is underlying a CDS contract the substitution approach of the Basel frameworks implies a reduction of $\Lambda(\cdot)$ as the hedging volume increases for a given volume of loans. If a bank, however, buys more CDS contracts than required for completely hedging her credit risk exposure, the exceeding part of $H$ will be treated according to the Basel market risk approach and thus will increase the amount of risk-weighted assets. A minimum level of $\Lambda(\cdot)$ will appear when hedging precisely covers the bank’s exposure to credit risk. For a given amount of CDS contracts the amount of risk-weighted assets increases with a higher volume of loans as long as the bank’s exposure to credit risk is not fully hedged. In case of
over-hedging the total exposure to credit risk an increase of the volume of loans decreases the amount of risk-weighted assets. When hedging activities precisely cover the bank’s total exposure to credit risk, a marginal change of the loan volume does not affect the amount of risk-weighted assets.

Taking into account the modified specification of the function $\Lambda(\cdot)$, a risk-neutral bank maximizes the expected profit by setting deposit and loan rates as well as the hedging volume according to the following first-order conditions, respectively:

$$\frac{-D(r_p)}{D'(r_p)} + (r - r_D) - C_p(D, L) = 0$$

$$(1 - \bar{\theta})\left(\frac{L(r_L)}{L'(r_L)} + r_L\right) - (r + \bar{\theta}) - C_L(D, L) + (r - r_K) K'(\cdot) \frac{\partial \Lambda(\cdot)}{\partial L(r_L)} = 0$$

$$(r - r_K) K'(\cdot) \frac{\partial \Lambda(\cdot)}{\partial H} + (\bar{\theta} - p) = 0$$

(16)

The first-order condition for the optimal deposit rate is not affected by the current modifications of the model. As a result, the bank’s optimal $r_p$ remains the same as in the previous section.

For an analysis of the implications of CDS trading and its regulatory treatment on the optimal loan rate we first consider the bank’s optimal hedging decision. We find that the bank chooses to under-hedge, fully hedge or over-hedge its total exposure to credit risk depending on the price of CDS contracts being higher, equal to or lower than the expected share of non-performing loans, respectively.

Consider first an unbiased CDS market. For $p = \bar{\theta}$ the first-order condition for the optimal level of $H$ requires $\partial \Lambda(\cdot)/\partial H = 0$ due to $r - r_K < 0$ and $K'(\cdot) > 0$. Given the current structure of the function $\Lambda(\cdot)$, this requirement is only met when $H = (1 + r_L)L(r_L)$, i.e. when hedging precisely covers the bank’s total exposure to credit risk. This case of a full hedge of the risk exposure implies in addition $\partial \Lambda(\cdot)/\partial L(r_L) = 0$ in the optimum which means that all regulation-related terms in the first-order condition for the optimal loan rate disappear. The remaining optimality condition is equivalent to the first-order condition for the optimal loan rate in the case without any regulation (section 2). Hence, the availability of an unbiased CDS market implies the same optimal level of $r_L$ as would be observed in the absence of any capital adequacy regulation.

Note that considering an unbiased CDS market represents a kind of benchmark since it isolates the pure effect of capital regulation on bank behavior. When in the determination of regulatory capital CDS trading is considered to be risk reducing one observes an incentive for banks to engage in active risk management. Compared to a regulation that does not account for credit risk mitigation using CDS contracts banks’ minimum required capital decreases.
This, in turn, reduces banks’ cost of capital and creates an income effect which is represented by the term

\[(r - r_x)K'(\cdot) \frac{\partial \Lambda(\cdot)}{\partial L(r_x)} < 0\]  

(17)

in the first-order necessary condition for the optimal loan rate. Moreover, under the Basel capital requirements the reduction of banks’ cost of capital and hence the income effect reaches a maximum for the case of a full hedge of the bank’s total exposure to credit risk.

When, in contrast, the CDS market is upward biased, i.e. \( p > \bar{\theta} \), the previous full-hedge result is no longer optimal. Instead, the first-order condition for the optimal volume of \( H \) requires \( \partial \Lambda(\cdot)/\partial H < 0 \) which is the case only for \( (1 + r_L)L(r_L) > H \) under the current assumptions. The bank now under-hedges, i.e. hedging activities cover just a part of the bank’s total exposure to credit risk. This is the result of a tradeoff between the (high) price for credit risk mitigation in the CDS market and savings in capital costs due to the regulatory treatment of CDS contracts. The under-hedge result implies \( \partial \Lambda(\cdot)/\partial L(r_L) > 0 \) in the optimum. Compared to the situation with an unbiased CDS market, the first-order condition for the optimal loan rate now includes a strictly negative regulation-related term. As a result – derived from the arguments that were outlined in section 3.1 – the regulated bank sets a higher loan rate compared to a non-regulated one.

In the case of a downward biased CDS market, i.e. \( p < \bar{\theta} \), one observes from the first-order condition that the optimal hedging volume requires \( \partial \Lambda(\cdot)/\partial H > 0 \) which is only met when \((1 + r_L)L(r_L) < H \). The bank over-hedges since both the effect of the low CDS price and the capital costs savings due to regulation aggravate each other. Regarding the optimal loan rate this implies \( \partial \Lambda(\cdot)/\partial L(r_L) < 0 \). Hence the regulation-related terms in the first-order condition for the optimal loan rate become positive and the optimal loan rate is lower than the one in the situation without any regulation. In other words: The bank expands the volume of loans compared to the non-regulated case.

From a capital market theory point of view one might argue that in particular in the latter situation of a downward biased CDS market there appears an oxymoron. Given that even without regulation (see previous results) there is an incentive for banks to demand CDS contracts and given that regulation aggravates this incentive, the price of CDS contracts may be expected to rise until the market is no longer biased.

However, as Nicolo and Pelizzon (2008) explain in their analysis of the optimal design of credit derivatives contracts in a setting of adverse selection and where banks are subject to capital requirements, their findings suggest that asymmetric information may generate underpricing of credit derivatives products when capital requirements make the retention of risk costly for the bank which is especially true for CDS contracts. Since this is exactly the
situation which is considered in our paper, the results of Nicolo and Pelizzon (2008) support the idea that CDS markets might be downward biased.

In addition, there is some anecdotal evidence from the recent financial crisis: Before the onset of the crisis in 2007 the price of credit risk protection in general and CDS contracts in particular appeared to be correct. Ex post, however, the price of CDS contracts was found to be too low due to shortcomings in the pricing models. This initiated a large-scale re-pricing of credit risk protection. Against this background our model explains not only why banks took too large CDS positions, but also why Basel-style regulation may have reinforced this behavior.

We can, therefore, state our third proposition:

**Proposition 3:** A Basel-type capital adequacy regulation creates incentives for a risk-neutral bank to actively engage in hedging credit risk using CDS contracts even if the CDS price is unbiased. Depending on whether the CDS market is downward biased, unbiased or upward biased, the bank over-hedges, fully hedges or under-hedges its total exposure to credit risk.

The substitution approach embedded in current capital regulation therefore weakens a tendency towards corner solutions in hedging decision. We observe an income effect due to the hedging-sensitivity of capital requirements. This income effect works against the effect arising from the potential biasedness of the CDS market. It prevents banks from taking extreme long or short positions in the CDS market.

5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this paper we model a bank taking deposits and granting risky loans which is subject to capital adequacy regulation and may engage in credit risk transfer using credit default swaps (CDS). We take specific care to integrate Basel II (and III) regulations into the industrial organization approach to banking for our analysis of lending behavior and risk sensitivity of a risk-neutral bank. This enables us to examine the interaction of capital adequacy regulation and credit risk transfer with credit default swaps.

We find that a Basel-type capital adequacy regulation induces a risk-neutral bank to behave in a risk-sensitive way: Compared to an unregulated risk-neutral bank the volume of risky loans will decrease under regulation. Moreover, the reduction of the loan volume will be stronger as the riskiness of the loan portfolio increases.

We also find an interaction between the former effect of regulation and the bank’s incentives to engage in credit risk transfer with CDS. When regulation accepts CDS as an instrument to mitigate credit risk, which is true for Basel II (and III), a risk-neutral bank will engage in CDS trading even if the CDS price is unbiased, i.e. the CDS price equals the expected loss rate of loans. In particular, due to the Substitution Approach in Basel II (and III) the risk-neutral bank finds it optimal to fully hedge its exposure to credit risk as long as the
CDS price is unbiased. An upward or downward biased CDS price, however, implies an under-hedge or an over-hedge of the bank’s credit risk exposure.

These effects of the Substitution Approach in Basel II (and III) on bank behavior are in line with the intention of the Basel regulations to “strengthen the soundness and stability of banks”: If capital adequacy regulation did not take into account the risk-reducing effect of CDS trading, it would stimulate a risk-neutral bank to take a more extreme position in a CDS market. According to Nicolo and Pelizzon (2008) these markets could well be downward biased, especially in time of a crisis.

Note that our analysis is compatible both with Basel II regulation and with the existing proposal for a new Basel III regulation. Basel III will increase the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, change the definition of equity, and deal with systemic risk. While the latter is no part of our research question, the former can easily be accounted for in our model.

When modeling increases in risk, we chose first-order stochastic dominance (FSD). We deliberately did not use a mean-preserving spread (MPS) since real-world risk increases in loan portfolios will typically not leave the mean loss rate unaffected (see Pausch and Welzel, 2002, for an analysis of MPS-type risk increases) While FSD appears like a purely theoretical concept we would like to point out its relation to the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR) used in banking. Ogryczak and Ruszczyński (2002) showed the equivalence of FSD and VaR, if one prospect has a lower VaR at all levels of risk tolerance than another.

In our view the analysis presented here can easily be re-interpreted to provide insights into a bank’s optimal risk taking behavior with respect to other risky assets or its total asset portfolio, when there is capital adequacy regulation and the possibility to hedge asset risk through trading it in a derivatives market. We would again conclude that the interplay of capital regulation and risk transfer works in the right direction, making banks more stable against adverse shocks.

We should finally mention a few things we chose not to include in our model. Our specification of the bank’s cost function uses a zero cross-derivative between the loans and deposits. Generalizing this assumption would amount to allowing for economies or diseconomies of scope between a bank’s loan business and its deposit business. Economies would in some cases introduce an opposing force, but our results would be reversed only if these economies of scope were very strong.

If the bank we considered were risk-averse, there would be a genuine hedging motive. By focusing on a risk-neutral bank, we were able to isolate the effects of credit risk transfer and capital regulation and to work out how this makes a risk-neutral bank sensitive to risk.

Counterparty risk the CDS market is no explicit part of our analysis. Note, however, that we have an implicit understanding of the role of counterparty risk: Since the sellers of protection against credit risk to a large extent are other financial institutions, we expect these institutions in many cases to have better ratings than the bank’s borrowers. The
Substitution Approach in capital regulation mentioned above then takes account of this change from a more risky borrower to a less risky seller of protection when credit risk transfer takes place.

The CDS we included in our model as hedging device provided a perfect hedge against the bank’s credit risk. In reality there will hardly exist a derivative with a perfect (negative) correlation with the risk of a bank’s loan portfolio. Remaining basis risk then leads to a reduction in the optimal hedge ratio compared to our analysis. Note also that credit derivatives in our model were only bought for hedging purposes. Including portfolio motives of a bank’s buying (and selling) protection against credit risk would require a much more complicated model. Since banks are the dominant players on both sides of the CDS market, i.e. not only sell credit risk but also buy it, a duopoly model of banks holding more than one loan type and interaction at least in the CDS market would be needed. Such a model which is beyond the scope of our present analysis would focus on the CDS market, endogenizing CDS prices.

The recent banking crisis has increased the awareness of liquidity risk on behalf of bankers and researchers. Future research with the framework we used here might include liquidity risk via an uncertain interest rate in the interbank market.

APPENDIX

In this Appendix we briefly outline how capital requirements for credit risk are calculated under Basel II (and also the proposal for Basel III), showing that our model captures the essential features of this regulatory framework. For this purpose we build on an explanatory note of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) and on a supporting document to the Basel II accord by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001).

Under Basel II a bank calculates the level of Minimum Required Capital (MRC) by multiplying Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) and a constant Capital Ratio (CR) which is 8% times scaling factor:

\[ MRC = RWA \cdot \gamma \]  

(18)

Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) are derived by multiplying the Exposure At Default (EAD) with a Risk Weight (RW):

\[ RWA = EAD \cdot RW \]  

(19)

The Risk Weight (RW), in turn, is a function of the Loss Given Default (LGD), Probability of Default (PD), and the assets’ maturity:

\[ RW = RW(LGD, PD, M) = CF \cdot LGD \cdot \Phi(PD) \cdot \Psi(M), \]  

(20)
where (CF) represents a constant factor, \( \Phi(\cdot) \) is a function that determines the “effective PD” by correcting the initial PD for the correlation of assets in a bank’s portfolio. In addition, \( \Psi(\cdot) \) determines the “effective maturity” of the assets.

Since we consider a one-period setting, we can abstract from the maturity of assets. \( \Psi(\cdot) \) is therefore irrelevant. The Exposure At Default (EAD) correspond to the total volume of loans \( L(r_L) \) in our model. The Basel framework assumes that EAD is independent of PD and LGD which is also an implicit assumption of our model.

In the Basel frameworks the PD is modeled as a random variable that needs to be determined for a bank’s assets. In our model the PD is implicitly given by the probability distribution function of the share \( \tilde{\theta} \) of non-performing loans. The PD in the model corresponds to the probability of default of the bank’s total loan portfolio and is affected by the risk-shifting parameter \( s \).

The Loss Given Default (LGD) in the Basel framework should be understood as the expected value of a random variable that determines the expected share of an asset that needs to be written off in the case of default. In the model the LGD, therefore, corresponds to \( \tilde{\theta} \). In the Basel frameworks the LGD is treated as a constant parameter that is either given by asset class (Foundation IRB Approach) or calculated by banks based on their internal models (Advanced IRB Approach). Note that in the model of the present paper the PD as well as the LGD may be affected by the risk-shifting parameter \( s \) and may thus be interrelated.

Given these interpretations, we can conclude that RWAs are derived from the function \( \Lambda(\cdot) \) in our model which may be rewritten as

\[
\Lambda(L(r_L) \mid s) = L(r_L)\Phi(\tilde{\theta} \mid s)
\]  

for the case of the Basel framework.

Moreover, the Basel rules suggest for the shape of \( \Phi(\tilde{\theta} \mid s) \)

\[
\frac{d\Phi(\cdot)}{ds} > 0, \quad \frac{d^2\Phi(\cdot)}{ds^2} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial\Phi(\cdot)}{\partial\tilde{\theta}} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2\Phi(\cdot)}{\partial\tilde{\theta}^2} = 0
\]  

Regarding \( \Lambda(\cdot) \) we then derive

\[
\frac{d\Lambda(\cdot)}{dL(r_L)} = \Lambda'(\cdot) = \Phi(\tilde{\theta} \mid s) > 0, \quad \frac{d^2\Lambda(\cdot)}{dL(r_L)^2} = 0, \quad \frac{d\Lambda'(\cdot)}{ds} = \frac{d\Phi(\cdot)}{ds} > 0
\]  

and

\[
\frac{\partial\Lambda(\cdot)}{\partial\Phi(\cdot)} = L(r_L) > 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2\Lambda(\cdot)}{\partial\Phi(\cdot)^2} = 0
\]
Moreover, the MRC is determined by the function $K(\cdot)$ in our model which can be written more explicitly after applying the Basel definitions as

$$MRC = K(\Lambda(\cdot)) = \Lambda(L(r_{L})) | s) \cdot \gamma$$

with $K'(\cdot) = \gamma > 0$ and $K''(\cdot) = 0$.

For deriving comparative static results in our model it should be noted that by the Basel definitions under the Standard Approach and under the Foundation IRB Approach for credit risk the LGD (i.e. $\overline{\theta}$ ) is predefined by asset class which rules out an direct effect of the risk-shifting parameter $s$ on $\overline{\theta}$ via FSD. However, given a certain asset class risk weights vary depending on the external rating of an asset. As a result, in case of a rating downgrade the risk weight of a certain asset may increase.

In the Advanced IRB Approach for credit risk the LGD (i.e. $\overline{\theta}$ ) shall be determined by a bank itself using internal models. In this case there may appear an effect of the risk-shifting parameter $s$ on $\overline{\theta}$ which implies for the Risk Weight $\Phi(\cdot)$

$$\frac{d\Phi(\cdot)}{ds} = \frac{\partial \Phi(\cdot)}{\partial s} + \frac{\partial \Phi(\cdot)}{\partial \overline{\theta}} \frac{d\overline{\theta}}{ds} > 0$$

REFERENCES

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector, consultative document, Bank for International Settlements, Basel


D’Arcy, S., McNichols, J., Zhao, X. (2009), A Primer on Credit Derivatives, Department of Finance, University of Illinois

Deutsche Bundesbank (2010), Entwicklung, Aussagekraft und Regulierung des Marktes für Kreditausfall-Swaps, Monatsbericht Dezember 2010, 47-64


ECB (2009), Credit Default Swaps and Counterparty Risk, Frankfurt


Helm, R., Geffen, D., Capistrion, S. (2009), Mutual Funds’ Use of Credit Default Swaps - Part I, Investment Lawyer 16(12), 3-9


Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S. (1984), Corporate Financing and Investment Decision when Firms have Information that Investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221


Pausch, T., Welzel, P. (2002), Credit Risk and the Role of Capital Adequacy Regulation, University of Augsburg, Institute of Economics, discussion paper no. 224


Stulz, R.M. (2010), Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, 73–92


